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Abstract—Users accessing services are often required to provide personal information, for example, age, profession and location, in
order to satisfy access polices. This personal information is evident in the application of e-ticketing where discounted access is granted
to visitor attractions or transport services if users satisfy policies related to their age or disability or other defined over attributes. We
propose a privacy-preserving electronic ticket scheme using attribute-based credentials to protect users’ privacy. The benefit of our
scheme is that the attributes of a user are certified by a trusted third party so that the scheme can provide assurances to a seller that a
user’s attributes are valid. The scheme makes the following contributions: (1) users can buy different tickets from ticket sellers without
releasing their exact attributes; (2) two tickets of the same user cannot be linked; (3) a ticket cannot be transferred to another user; (4)
a ticket cannot be double spent. The novelty of our scheme is to enable users to convince ticket sellers that their attributes satisfy the
ticket policies and buy discounted tickets anonymously. This is a step towards identifying an e-ticketing scheme that captures user
privacy requirements in transport services. The security of our scheme is proved and reduced to a well-known complexity assumption.
The scheme is also implemented and its performance is empirically evaluated.
Index Terms—Anonymity, Attribute-based Credentials, Privacy-enhanced Authentication, Electronic Ticket
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1 INTRODUCTION
Due to their flexibility and portability, electronic ticket (e-
ticket) systems have been extensively investigated by both
industry [1], [2] and the academic research communities [3],
[4], [5]. E-tickets are attractive to transport operators as well
as customers because they can reduce paper costs (tickets
can be stored on a hand-held device) and improve customer
experience (tickets can be purchased and delivered any time
and anywhere). However, the use of e-tickets also raises
many questions regarding the privacy of its users due to
the possibility of linking different e-ticket transactions to
a particular user –in contrast to anonymous paper-based
tickets– and thus potentially revealing private information,
e.g. working patterns, likely places of work, etc.
Customers are increasingly aware of privacy issues es-
pecially in light of the newly introduced general data pro-
tection regulations (GDPR) [6]. One way to address this
is through anonymous authentication which enables users
to authenticate without revealing their identities and this
approach has been used to protect a user’s privacy in many
privacy-preserving e-ticket schemes [3], [7], [8], [9], [10],
[11]. However, many of these schemes were not formally
proven to be secure. Notable exceptions are those proposed
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by Arfaoui et al. [8] and Rupp et al. [12]. Arfaoui et al. [8]
formally defined their security models for e-ticket schemes,
including unforgeability, unlinkability and non-repudiation,
but the authors only provided a very high-level proof.
Rupp et al. [12] formalised their security models of privacy-
preserving pre-payments with refunds schemes including
transportation authority security and user privacy but the
security proof of their scheme was again at a high level.
Another requirement of a realistic e-ticket systems is the
support for different tickets based on a user’s attributes
(e.g. age, location, disability, profession, etc.), i.e. to offer
discounts for, say, students or disabled passengers. How-
ever, if not implemented carefully, there is a risk that such
a ticket system reveals more information about a user than
necessary when purchasing or validating tickets. For exam-
ple, a student buying a discounted student ticket may end
up revealing the university at which she is enrolled and,
depending on the student card, even her birthday neither
of which is relevant to obtaining the student discount. The
minimum proof required is that she can demonstrate that
she is a legitimate student. Similarly, a disabled passenger
might need to reveal more details about his disability to
the ticket seller or verifier than necessary for purchasing or
verifying a ticket. Gudymenko [10] and Kerschbaum et al.
[11] addressed this issue, but their schemes were not proven
formally.
Transport operators are naturally concerned about
fraudulent use of e-tickets due to the ease with which they
can be copied. Double spend or more generally overspend
detection, i.e. the process of determining whether a ticket
has been used too many times, is therefore also an important
feature that an e-ticket scheme should support.
To address the above requirements, this paper proposes
a new privacy-preserving e-ticket scheme using attribute-
2based credentials which supports issuing different tick-
ets depending on a user’s attributes. Our scheme pro-
tects an honest user’s privacy while allowing for the de-
anonymisation of users who try to use their tickets more
than once (double spend detection). It is also a general
e-ticket system and can be used in various application
scenarios including:
• mobility as a service transport tickets (e.g. rail, bus,
etc.) where age, disability, profession, affiliation, etc.
might determine the prices of tickets;
• one-off token for Internet services (e.g. print ser-
vice, download service for multimedia, etc.) where
age, affiliation, membership might determine the
service/access level;
• e-voting where age, nationality, voting district, etc.
might determine the voting ballot that should be
issued;
• event tickets (e.g. concert, tourist attractions, confer-
ences, etc.) where age, affiliation, disability, etc. might
determine the ticket price/access rights.
1.1 Contributions
In this paper, we propose a new attribute-based e-ticket
scheme. The main contributions of our scheme are: (1)
Attribute-based Ticketing: users can buy different tickets
depending on their certified attributes without releasing
their exact details; (2) Unlinkability: two tickets of the same
user cannot been linked; (3) Untransferability: a ticket can
only be used by the ticket holder and cannot be transferred
to another user; (4) Double Spend Detection: a ticket cannot
be double spent and the identities of users who try to double
spend tickets can be revealed.
The novelty of our scheme is to enable users to convince
ticket sellers that their attributes satisfy the ticket policies
and buy discounted tickets anonymously. Our scheme thus
offers a natural as well as flexible way of representing user
attributes, e.g. to obtain an age based discount, a user would
expect to prove that her age is in a certain range, while
for a disability discount, she would want to demonstrate
her impairment is contained within the set of recognised
disabilities. Furthermore, a user’s attributes are additionally
certified by a trusted third party thereby allowing a user’s
claimed attributes to also be verified.
The theoretical contribution is that the security of the
proposed scheme is formally proven and reduced to a well-
known complexity assumption. The scheme is also imple-
mented and performance timings are given.
1.2 Related Work
Mut-Puigserver et al. [4] surveyed numerous e-ticket sys-
tems and summarised their various functional requirements
(e.g. expiry date, portability, flexibility, etc.) and security
requirements (e.g. integrity, authentication, fairness, non-
overspending, anonymity, transferability, unlinkability, etc.).
E-ticket schemes are classified into different types: transfer-
able tickets [5], [7], untransferable tickets [3], [13], multi-
use tickets [3], [4] and single-use tickets [3], [5], [7], [14].
Our scheme falls into the untransferable, single-use tickets
categories while providing anonymity, unlinkability, non-
overspending and flexibility.
We now compare our scheme with a number of other
schemes. In these schemes, blind signatures [15], group sig-
natures [16], anonymous credentials [17] and pseudonyms
[16], [18] were used to protect user privacy.
E-Ticket Schemes from Blind Signatures. In a blind signa-
ture scheme, a user can obtain a signature on a message
without the signer knowing the content. Based on the blind
signature scheme proposed by Chaum [15], Fan and Lei [19]
proposed an e-ticket system for voting in which each voter
can vote in different elections using only one ticket. Song
and Korba [9] proposed an e-ticket scheme to protect users’
privacy and provide non-repudiation in pay-TV systems.
Quercia and Hailes [20] proposed an e-ticket scheme for
mobile transactions using Chaum’s blind signature scheme
[15] to generate both limited-use and unlimited-use tick-
ets. Rupp et al. [12], [21] proposed privacy-preserving pre-
payments with refunds schemes derived from Chaum’s
scheme [22] and Boneh et al.’s short signature scheme [23].
In their scheme, trip authorisation tokens were generated
using Chaum’s blind signatures, while Boneh et al.’s short
signature scheme was used to implement the privacy-
preserving aggregation of refunds. Milutinovice et al. [3]
proposed an e-ticket scheme which combines the partial
blind signature scheme proposed by Abe et al. [24], Ped-
ersen’s secret sharing commitment scheme [25] and Ca-
menisch et al.’s anonymous credential scheme [26] to protect
user privacy. All these schemes can protect user privacy and
provide ticket unlinkability, but, unlike our scheme, they do
not support de-anonymisation after double spending nor
ticket untransferability.
E-Ticket Schemes from Group Signatures. A group signature
enables a user to sign a message on behalf of the group with-
out exposing his identity, while the group manager can re-
lease the identity of the real signer. Nakanishi et al. [27] pro-
posed an electronic coupon (e-coupon) scheme where the
group signature scheme [28] was used to provide anonymity
and unlinkability. Vives-Guasch [29] proposed an automatic
fare collection (AFC) system in which the group signature
scheme proposed by Boneh et al. [30] was used to provide
unlinkability and revocable anonymity. These schemes can
implement anonymity, de-anonymity, ticket unlinkability
and ticket untransferability, but, unlike our scheme, they
do not support privacy-preserving attribute-based ticketing.
While Gudymenko in [10] addressed user privacy as well as
differently priced tickets in his e-ticket scheme and used
group signatures to make tickets unlinkable, no formal
security models and security proofs were presented.
E-Ticket Schemes from Anonymous Credentials. In an anony-
mous credential scheme, a user can prove to a verifier that
she has obtained a credential without releasing any other
information. Heydt-Benjamin et al. [7] used anonymous cre-
dentials, e-cash and proxy re-encryption schemes to enhance
the security and privacy of their public transport e-ticket
systems. Arfaoui et al. [8] modified the signature scheme
proposed Boneh et al. in [31] to eliminate expensive pairing
operations in the verification phase, and then proposed a
privacy-preserving near field communication (NFC) mobile
ticket (m-ticket) system by combining their modified signa-
ture with the anonymous credential scheme proposed by
Camenisch et al. [32]. In their scheme, a user can anony-
mously use an m-ticket at most k times, otherwise the user
3is revoked by the revocation authority. These schemes can
implement anonymity, ticket unlinkability as well as ticket
untransferability, but, unlike our scheme, do not support
privacy-preserving attribute-based ticketing. Additionally,
the security of these schemes was not formally proven.
E-Ticket Schemes from Pseudonyms. Pseudonyms allow a
user to interact with multiple organisations anonymously
and potentially without linkability. Fujimura and Nakajima
[33] proposed a general-purpose e-ticket framework where
anonymity was achieved by using pseudonym schemes
[34], [35]. Jorns et al. [36] proposed a pseudonym scheme
which could be implemented on constrained devices, and
then used it to protect users’ privacy in e-ticket systems.
Kuntze and Schmidt [37] proposed a scheme to generate
pseudonym tickets by using the identities embedded in
attestation identity keys (AIKs) certified by the privacy
certificate authority (PCA). Vives-Guasch et al. [38] proposed
a light-weight e-ticket scheme using pseudonyms which
also addressed exculpability (i.e. a service provider cannot
falsely accuse a user of having overspent her ticket, and the
user is able to demonstrate that she has already validated
the ticket before using it) and reusability (i.e. a ticket can be
used a predefined number of times). In [38], pseudonyms
were used to provide unlinkability of users’ transactions.
Kerschbaum et al. [11] considered the privacy-preserving
billing issue in e-ticket schemes and applied pseudonyms
to provide unlinkability of user transactions. These schemes
can implement anonymity, ticket unlinkability as well as
ticket untransferability, but, unlike our scheme, they do
not support privacy-preserving attribute-based ticketing.
Furthermore, the security of these schemes was not formally
proven.
E-Tickets from Special Devices. There are other e-ticket
schemes designed around special devices, including per-
sonal trusted device (PTD) [39], trusted platform module
(TPM) [37], mobile handsets [40], etc. Unlike our scheme,
these schemes require special devices and do not enable de-
anonymisation after double spending a ticket nor do they
support privacy-preserving attribute-based ticketing.
We compare our scheme with related schemes in Table
1, in terms of unlinkability, untransferability, double spend
detection, de-anonymisation, attribute-based ticketing and
security proof, where −− indicates that security was not
considered by the authors of the respective schemes.
The European Telecommunications Standards Institute
(ETSI) [41], [42] released two specifications on attribute-
based encryption (ABE) which can be used to securely
protect personal data and implement fine-grained access
control. In an ABE scheme, a message is encrypted by using
a set of attributes so that only the users whose attributes
match those in the ciphertext can decrypt it and see the
message. As specified in [42], ABE supports offline access
control. However, in our scheme, a user can only authenti-
cate to an online verifier. Furthermore, an issued credential
enables a user to prove that she holds required attributes
without revealing them.
1.3 Organisation
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. In
Section 2, the preliminaries used throughout this paper are
described. The construction of our scheme is presented in
Section 4 . In Section 5, the performance of our scheme
is evaluated. Section 6 presents the security proof of our
scheme. Finally, Section 7 concludes this paper.
2 PRELIMINARIES
In this section, the preliminaries used throughout this paper
are introduced. The most important notation is summarised
in Table 2. We define a function (x) is negligible if for any
k ∈ N, there exists an Nk such that (y) ≤ 1yk for all y > Nk.
2.1 Bilinear Groups
Let G1, G2 and Gτ be cyclic group with prime order p. A
map e : G1 × G2 → Gτ is a bilinear map if the following
properties are satisfied [43]:
1) Bilinearity. For all g ∈ G1, h ∈ G2 and x, y ∈ Zp,
e(gx, hy) = e(gy, hx) = e(g, h)xy ;
2) Non-degeneration. For all g ∈ G1 and h ∈ G2,
e(g, h) 6= 1τ where 1τ is the identity element in Gτ ;
3) Computability. For all g ∈ G1 and h ∈ G2, there
exists an efficient algorithm to compute e(g, h).
Note that Galbraith, Paterson and Smart [44] classified
parings into three basic types: Type-I: G1 = G2; Type-II:
G1 6= G2 and there exists an efficient map ψ : G1 → G1;
Type-III: G1 6= G2 but there is no efficient map between G1
and G2. Our scheme is based on the Type-I pairing which is
used to construct the signature below.
In the case that G1 = G2, e is called symmetric bilinear
map. Let BG(1`) → (e, p,G,Gτ ) be a symmetric bilinear
group generator which takes as input a security parameter
1` and outputs a bilinear group (e, p,G,Gτ ) with prime
order p and e : G×G→ Gτ .
2.2 Complexity Assumptions
Definition 1. (q-Strong Diffie-Hellman (SDH) Assumption
[31]) Let BG(1`) → (e, p,G,Gτ ), g be a generator of G
and x R← Zp. We say that the q-strong Diffie-Hellman
assumption holds on G if for all probabilistic polynomial
time (PPT) adversary A given (g, gx, · · · , gxq ) can out-
put a pair (c, g
1
x+c ) with negligible probability, namely
Advq−SDHA = Pr
[
A(g, gx, · · · , gxq )→ (x, g 1x+c )
]
≤
(`), where c ∈ Zp.
The security of the following two signatures used in
our scheme and thus our overall security can be shown to
reduce to this complexity assumption.
2.3 Zero-Knowledge Proof
In this paper, we use zero-knowledge proof of knowl-
edge protocols to prove knowledge of statements about
discrete logarithms [45], including discrete logarithm,
equality, product, disjunction and conjunction. We follow
the notation proposed in [28] and formalised in [46].
By PoK
{
(α, β, γ) : A = gαhβ ∧ A˜ = g˜αh˜γ
}
, we denote a
zero-knowledge proof of knowledge of α, β and γ such
that A = gαhβ and A˜ = g˜αh˜γ hold in groups G and G˜
simultaneously, where G = 〈g〉 = 〈h〉 and G˜ = 〈g˜〉 = 〈h˜〉.
Conventionally, the values in the parenthesis (α, β, γ) de-
note quantities of knowledge which is being proven, while
the other values are public to the verifier.
4TABLE 1
The Comparison Between Our Scheme and Related Schemes
Schemes Unlinkability Untransferability Double Spend De-anonymisation Attribute-based Security ProofDetection Ticketing
[3] 3 3 3 7 7 Sketch
[9] 3 7 3 7 7 Sketch
[27] 3 3 3 3 7 Sketch
[29] 3 3 3 3 7 Sketch
[10] 3 3 3 3 7 −−
[19] 3 3 3 7 7 Sketch
[20] 3 7 3 3 7 Sketch
[12], [21] 3 3 3 7 7 Sketch
[7] 3 3 3 7 7 Sketch
[8] 3 3 3 3 7 Sketch
[36] 3 3 7 7 7 −−
[37] 3 3 3 3 7 −−
[38] 3 3 3 3 7 −−
[11] 3 3 3 3 7 Sketch
Our Scheme 3 3 3 3 3 Reduction
TABLE 2
Notation
1` A security number
(`) A negligible function in `
CA A central authority
S A ticket seller
U A user
V A ticket verifier
H A cryptographic hash function
P A universal set of ticket policies
PU The policies satisfied by U
Rj The j-th range policy
Si The i-th set policy
Iij The j-th item in Si
σS A credential of S
σU A credential of U
AU The attributes of U
IDU The identity of U
IDS The identity of S
PoK Proof of knowledge
PsU A pseudonym of U
Serv The services requested by U
V PX A validity period for X
MSK The master secret key of the system
params The public parameters of the system
Price The price of a ticket
T icketU A ticket of U
TransT A proof transcript of the ticket T icketU
KG(1`) A secret-public key pair generation algorithm
BG(1`) A bilinear group generator
x
R← X x is randomly selected from the set X
A(x)→ y y is obtained by running the algorithm A(·)
with input x
AU |= Iij AU satisfies the item Iij
(SKS , PKS) A secret-public key pair of S
(SKU , PKU ) A secret-public key pair of U
2.4 Boneh-Boyen (BB) Signature
In 2004, Boneh and Boyen [31] proposed a short signature
scheme. This scheme was used to construct efficient set-
membership proof and range proof [47]. In this paper, we
use this signature scheme to generate tags for the ticket
policies. The scheme works as follows:
KeyGen. Let BG(1`)→ (e, p,G,Gτ ) and g1, g2 be generators
of G. The signer generates a secret-public key pair (x, Y )
where x R← Zp and Y = gx2 .
Signing. To sign on a message m ∈ Zp, the signer computes
the signature as σ = g
1
x+m
1 .
Verifying. To verify whether σ is a signature on the message
m, the verifier checks e(σ, Y gm2 )
?
= e(g1, g2).
Theorem 1. (Boneh and Boyen [31]) This signature scheme is
(qS , (`))-secure against existentially forgery under the
weak chosen message attacks if the (q, ′(`))-SDH as-
sumption holds on (e, p,G,Gτ ), where qS is the number
of signing queries made by the adversary A, q > qS and
′(`) = (`).
2.5 Signature with Efficient Proof Protocol
Au et al. [48] proposed a signature with an efficient proof
protocol scheme and referred to it as BBS+ signature. In this
paper, we use their signature scheme to issue credentials to
users and ticket sellers and to generate tickets for users. This
scheme works as follows:
KeyGen. Let BG(1`) → (e, p,G,G,Gτ ) and (h, g0, g1, · · · ,
gn+1) be generators of G. The signer generates a secret-
public key pair (x, Y ) where x R← Zp and Y = hx.
Signing. To sign on (m1,m2, · · · ,mn) ∈ Znp , the signer se-
lects w, s R← Zp and computes σ = (g0gs1gm12 · · · gmnn+1)
1
x+w .
The signature on (m1,m2, · · · ,mn) is (w, s, σ).
Verifying. To verify whether (w, s, σ) is a valid signature
on (m1,m2, · · · ,mn), the verifier checks e(σ, Y hw) ?=
e(g0g
s
1g
m1
2 · · · gmnn+1, h).
Proof of the Signature. To prove (w, s, σ) is a signature on
(m1,m2, · · · ,mn), the prover selects r1, r2 R← Zp, and
computes A1 = σg
r1
2 and A2 = g
r1
1 g
r2
2 . Let t1 = wr1 and
t2 = wr2. We utilise Au et al.’s [48] honest-verifier zero-
knowledge proof of knowledge protocol, Π, as follows:
PoK

(r1, r2, t1, t2, w, s, σ,m1, · · · ,mn) : A2 = gr11 gr22 ∧
Aw2 = g
t1
1 g
t2
2 ∧ e(A1,Y )e(g0,h) = e(g1, h)s · e(A1, Y )−w·
e(g2, h)
r1w · e(g2, Y )r1 ·
∏n+1
i=2 e(gi, h)
m−1
 .
Theorem 2. (Au et al. [48]) This signature with an effi-
cient proof protocol is (qS , (`))-existentially unforge-
able under the adaptively chosen message attacks if the
5(q, ′(`))-SDH assumption holds on (e, p,G,Gτ ), where
qS is the number of signing queries made by the adver-
sary A, q > qS and (`)′ > q · (`).
3 FORMAL DEFINITIONS AND SECURITY MODELS
In this section, we provide the formal definitions and secu-
rity models of our scheme which will be used to verify its
security.
3.1 Formal Definitions
Our scheme consists of the following four entities: central
authority CA, user U, ticket seller S and ticket verifier V. CA
authenticates U and S, and issues anonymous credentials to
them; S registers to the CA, obtains anonymous credentials
from the CA, and sells tickets to U in accordance with the
ticket policies; U registers to the CA, obtains anonymous
credentials from the CA, purchases tickets from S, and
proves the possession of tickets to V; V validates the tickets
provided by U and detects whether a ticket is double spent.
The interactions between the different entities in our
scheme is shown in Fig. 1. The algortihms associated with
these interactions are formally defined as follows:
Setup(1`) → (MSK, params,P). CA inputs a security
parameter 1`, and outputs the master secret key MSK,
the public parameters params and a universal set of ticket
polices P.
Registration. This algorithm consists of the following two
sub-algorithms: S’s registration SRegistration and U’s regis-
tration URegistration.
1) SRegistration(S(IDS , SKS , PKS , params) ↔
CA(MSK,PKS , params)) → (σS , (IDS , PKS)).
S runs the key generation algorithm KG(1`) →
(SKS , PKS) to generate his secret-public key
pair (SKS , PKS), inputs his identity IDS , his
secret-public key pair (SKS , PKS) and the pubic
parameters params, and outputs a credential σS .
CA inputs his secret key MSK, S’s public key PKS
and the public parameters params, and outputs
(IDS , PKS).
2) URegistration(U(IDU , AU , SKU , PKU , params)↔
CA(MSK,AU , PKU , params)) → (σU , (IDU ,
PKU )). U runs the key generation algorithm
KG(1`) → (SKU , PKU ) to generate his secret-
public key pair (SKU , PKU ), inputs his identity
IDU , his attributes AU , his secret-public key pair
(SKU , PKU ) and the public parameters params,
and outputs a credential σU . CA inputs the mas-
ter secret key MSK, U’s attributes AU , U’s public
key PKU and the public parameters params, and
outputs (IDU , PKU ).
Ticket-Issuing(U(SKU , PKU , AU , σU , PsU ,P, V P, Serv,
params) ↔ S(SKS , PKS , PsU ,P, P rice, V P, Serv,
params)) → (TicketU , (PsU , Service)). This is an
interactive algorithm executed between U and S. U inputs
his secret-public key pair (SKU , PKU ), his attributes AU ,
his credential σU , a pseudonym PsU , the ticket policies P, a
valid period V P , the selected services Serv and the public
parameters params, and outputs a ticket TicketU . S inputs
his secret-public key pair (SKS , PKS), the pseudonym
PsU , the ticket policies P, the ticket price Price, the valid
period V P , the selected services Serv and the public
parameters params, and outputs (PsU , Serv).
Ticket-Validating(U(SKU , PsU , T icketU , V P, Serv, params)
↔ V(V P, Serv, params)) → (0/1, (Serv, TransT )). This
is an interactive algorithm executed between U and V. U
inputs his secret-pubic key pair (SKU , PKU ), his ticket
TicketU , the valid period V P , the selected services Serv
and the pubic parameters params, and outputs 1 if TicketU
is valid; otherwise it outputs 0 to indicate a failure. V inputs
the valid period V P , the selected services Serv and the
pubic parameters params, and outputs (Serv, TransT ).
Double-Spend-Detecting(TransT , params) → (PKU ,⊥).
V inputs a proof transcript TransT and the public parame-
ters params and outputs U’s public key PKU if U has used
a ticket twice; otherwise it outputs ⊥ to indicate that no
double spend is found.
Definition 2. A privacy-preserving electronic ticket scheme
with attribute-based credential is correct if
Pr

Setup(1`)→ (msk, params,P);
Ticket− SRegistration(S(IDS , SKS ,
Validating PKS , params)↔ CA(MSK,
(U(SKU , PKS , params))→ (σS , (IDS ,
PsU , PKS));
TicketU , URegistration(U(IDU , AU ,
V P, Serv, SKU , PKU , params)↔
params) CA(MSK,PKU , AU , params))
↔ V(V P, → (σU , (IDU , PKU ));
Serv, Ticket− Issuing(U(SKU , PKU ,
params)) AU , σU , PsU ,P, V P, Serv,
→ (1, params)↔ S(SKS , PKS ,
(Serv, PsU ,P, V P, Serv, params))
TransT )) → (TicketU , (PsU , Serv));
AU |= P

= 1
and
Pr

Setup(1`)→ (msk, params,P);
SRegistration(S(IDS , SKS ,
PKS , params)↔ CA(MSK,
PKS , params))→ (σS , (IDS ,
PKS));
Double− URegistration(U(IDU , AU ,
Spend− SKU , PKU , params)↔
Detecting CA(MSK,PKU , AU , params))
(TransT , → (σU , (IDU , PKU ));
params) Ticket− Issuing(U(SKU , PKU ,
→ PKU AU , σU , PsU ,P, V P, Serv,
params)↔ S(SKS , PKS , PsU ,
P, V P, Service, params))→
(TU , (PsU , Service));
AU |= P ∧ TU is double spent.

= 1.
3.2 Security Model
While Universally Composable (UC) security models [49]
can offer strong security, it is very difficult to construct
6Central Authority (CA)
Ticket Seller (S) User (U)
Verifier (V)
3. Ticket-Issuing:	(!"#,Serv, #,VP,Price)$%&'()#
4. Ticket-Validating:
(!"#,Serv, #,VP, $*+,"-) 5.	Double-
Spend-
DetectingGrant/Deny
1. Setup:	ticket	price	policies:	 ;
master	secrete	key:	MSK;
public	parameters:	params;
Fig. 1. The Model of our scheme
a scheme which can be shown to provide UC security.
To the best of our knowledge, none of the existing smart
ticketing schemes was proven in UC security model. Con-
sequently, the security of our scheme is defined by using
the simulation-based definition as introduced in [50], [51],
[52], [53]. The simulation-based model is defined by the
indistinguishability between the following real world and
ideal world experiment.
The Real-World Experiment. We first present how our scheme
works where the central authority CA, the ticket seller S,
the user U and the ticket verifier V are honest. The real-
world adversary A can control S, U and V, but cannot
control CA. The entities controlled by A can deviate ar-
bitrarily from their behaviour described below. CA runs
Setup(1`) → (MSK, params,P) to generate the master
secret key msk, system public parameters params and the
universal set P of ticket polices, and sends params and P to
U, S and V.
When receiving a registration message (registration,
IDS) from E , S executes the seller registration algorithm
SRegistration with CA. S runs KG(1`) → (SKS , PKS),
takes as input his identity IDS , the secret-public key pair
(SKS , PKS) and the public parameters params, outputs a
credential σS . CA takes inputs his master secret key MSK,
S’s public key PKS and the public parameters params, and
outputs S’s identity IDS and public key PKS . S sends a bit
b ∈ {0, 1} to E to show whether the SRegistation algorithm
succeed (b = 1) or failed (b = 0).
When receiving a registration message (registration,
IDU , AU ) from E , U executes the user registration algorithm
URegistration with CA. U runs KG(1`) → (SKU , PKU ),
takes as input his identity IDU , attributes AU , secret-public
key pair (SKU , PKU ) and the public parameters params,
and outputs a credential σU . CA takes inputs his master
secret key MSK, U’s public key PKU and the public pa-
rameters params, and outputs U’s identity IDU , attributes
AU and public key PKU . U sends a bit b˜ ∈ {0, 1} to E to
show whether the URegistation algorithm succeed (b˜ = 1)
or failed (b˜ = 0).
When receiving a ticket issuing message (ticket
issuing,AU , V P, Service) from E , U first checks whether
he has got a credential for AU . If so, U executes the ticket
issuing algorithm Ticket-Issuing with S. U takes as inputs
his secret-public key pair (SKU , PKU ), attributes AU , a
pseudonym PsU , his credential σU , the valid period V P ,
the service Serv and the public parameters params. S takes
as input his secret-public key pair (SKS , PKS), the valid
period V P , the service Serv and the public parameters
params. Finally, U obtains a ticket TU or ⊥ to show failure.
S outputs U’s pseudonym PsU and the service Serv. If the
ticket issuing is successful, U sends a bit bˇ ∈ {0, 1} to E to
show the Ticket-Issuing algorithm succeed (bˇ = 1) or failed
(bˇ = 0).
When receiving a ticket validation message (ticket
validating, TU , V P, Serv, params) from E , U first checks
whether he has the ticket TU which includes the valid
period V P and the service Serv. If so, U executes the ticket
validating algorithm Ticket-Validating with V; otherwise U
outputs ⊥ to show he does not have the ticket TU . If U
has the ticket TU , he takes as input his secret-public key
pair (SKU , PKU ), the ticket TU , the valid period V P , the
service Serv and the system public parameters params, and
outputs a bit bˆ ∈ {0, 1} to show whether the ticket is valid
(bˆ = 1) or invalid (bˆ = 0). V takes input the valid period
V P , the service Serv and the public parameters params,
and outputs the service Serv and the transcript Trans.
Finally, if bˆ = 1, U returns success; otherwise U returns
fail.
When receiving a double spend detecting mes-
sage (double spend detecting, Trans, params) from E ,
V checks that whether there is a (Trans′, params) with
Trans = Trans′. If so, V returns a bit b¯ = 1 to indicate
that it is a double spend ticket; otherwise b¯ = 0 is returned
to show that the ticket has not been double spent.
The Ideal-World Experiment. In the ideal world experiment,
there are the same entitles as in real world experiment, in-
cluding the central authority CA′, ticket seller S′, user U′ and
ticket verifier V′. All communications among these entities
must go through a trusted party TP. The behaviour of TP
is described as follows. TP maintains four lists which are
7initially empty: a ticket seller credential list, a user credential
list, a ticket list for each user and a ticket validating list.
When receiving a registration message (registration,
IDS′) from S′, TP sends (registration, IDS′) to CA′ and
obtains a bit ν ∈ {0, 1} from CA′. If ν = 1, TP adds S′ into
the ticket seller credential list and sends ν to S′; otherwise,
TP sends ν = 0 to S′ to indicate failure.
When receiving a registration message (registration,
IDU ′ , AU ′) from U′, TP sends (registration, IDU ′ , AU ′) to
CA′ and obtains a bit ν˜ ∈ {0, 1} from CA′. If ν˜ = 1, TP
adds (U′, AU ′) into the user credential list and sends ν˜ to
U′; otherwise, TP sends ν˜ = 0 to S′ to indicate failure.
When receiving a ticket issuing message (ticket
issuing, PsU , P rice, V P, Serv) from U′, TP sends
(ticket issuing, PsU , P rice, V P, Serv) to S′ and obtains
a bit νˆ ∈ {0, 1} from S′. If νˆ = 1, TP adds (U′, AU ′ ,
PsU , P rice, V P, Serv) into the user ticket list, and sends
νˆ to V′; otherwise, TP sends νˆ = 0 to U′ to indicate failure.
When receiving a ticket validating message (ticket
validating, TU ′) from V′, TP checks whether TU ′ is in the
user ticket list. If so, TP sends a bit ν¯ = 1 to U′ and puts
TU ′ into the ticket validation list TV L; otherwise, TP
′ sends
ν¯ = 0 to indicate failure.
When receiving a double spend detecting message
(double spend detecting, TU ′) from V′, TP checks whether
TU ∈ TV L. If it is, TP returns νˇ = 1 to U′ to indicate it is
double spend; otherwise, νˇ = 0 is returned to show it is not
double spent.
The entities CA′, S′, U′ and V′ in ideal world simply relay
the inputs and outputs between E and TP.
Definition 3. Let RealE,A(`) be the probability that the
environment E outputs 1 when running in the real world
with the adversary A and IdealE,A′ be the probabil-
ity that E outputs 1 when running in the ideal world
with the adversary A′. A set of cryptographic protocols
is said to securely implement privacy-preserving elec-
tronic ticket scheme with attribute-based credential if
|RealE,A(`)− IdealE,A′(`)| ≤ (`).
Security Properties. We now look at the security properties
of our scheme which the ideal-world experiment can pro-
vide.
User’s Privacy. S′ does not know users’ identities and their
exact attributes, namely S′ only knows that a user buys
a ticket for which she has the required attributes. Even if
S′ colludes with V′ and potentially with other users, they
can only try to know the attributes required by the ticket
policies. Furthermore, two tickets for the same users cannot
be linked. Since each user needs to prove that he knows the
corresponding secret key included in a ticket when using
the ticket, he cannot transfer his tickets to others.
Seller’s Security. U′ cannot generate a ticket on behalf of the
seller S′. Even if U′ colludes potentially with other users and
V′, they cannot forge a valid ticket. Since a double spend
ticket can be detected and the real user can be identified, U′
cannot double spend a ticket. Therefore, the seller’s security
includes both unforgeability, double spend detection and
de-anonymization.
4 CONSTRUCTION OF OUR SCHEME
In this section, we describe the formal construction of our
scheme. Our scheme uses a number of ideas and concepts
from Au et al.’s signature with efficient protocol scheme [48],
Camenisch et al.’s set-membership proof scheme and range
proof scheme [47], Pedersen’s commitment scheme [25] and
Au et al.’s e-cash [54] scheme. In particular, we incorpo-
rated Au et al.’s signature scheme which enables a user to
obtain a signature on a committed block of attributes and
prove the knowledge of the signature in zero-knowledge.
This is to issue credentials to users and ticket sellers and
to generate tickets for users. We adapt Camenisch et al.
[47]’s set-membership proof and range proofs schemes to
prove a user’s attributes. In our scheme, these attributes
are additionally certified by a trusted third party as well.
Pedersen’s commitment scheme is used in our scheme to
hide the knowledge which a prover needs to prove. Lastly
we incorporate Au et al.’s [54] approach to detect and de-
anonymise a double spend user.
Construction challenges: The schemes described in [25], [47],
[48], [54] form the basis of our construction, the challenge is
to combine and adapt them such that the resulting scheme
provides the following three additional features: (1) The
attributes (e.g. age, disability, etc.) which a user needs to
prove to a ticket seller must be certified by a trusted third
party or otherwise users could simply buy discounted tick-
ets using attributes which they do not possess. To address
this, Au et al.’s signature scheme [48] is used to certify a
user’s attributes. (2) Tickets need to be untransferable and
unlinkable while doublespend detection must be possible.
Thus our tickets are generated using anonymous credentials
(unlinkability) which include a user’s personal information
(untransferability). To detect a double spend user, each
ticket includes a serial number. If two tickets have the same
serial number, the public trace technique proposed by Au
et al. in [54] is used to reveal the user’s identity (via her
public key). (3) To provide a high degree of flexibility for
setting ticket policies, both range policies and set policies
must be available for use. Users can then use their certified
attributes to demonstrate membership of multiple range
and set policies, e.g. to get a young-persons discount, a
frequent traveller bonus as well as a disability reduction.
4.1 High-Level Overview
In our e-ticket system, the type of tickets can be influenced
by two kinds of policies: range and set. Range policies
might include attributes like age, number of journeys made,
salary, etc.; while set policies might consist of various other
attributes, such as profession, disability, location, etc.
Setup. Figure 2 shows how the scheme is initialised. The
ticket price polices P is set to P =
{
R1, · · · ,RN1 , S1, · · · ,
SN2
}
where {R1, · · · ,RN1} are the supported range policies
and {S1, · · · , SN2} are the supported set policies. The CA se-
lects the following secret keys MSK = (x, y, µ1, · · · , µN2)
where x is used to generate credentials for users of the
system, y is used to generate tags identifying the range
policies and the µi (i = 1, · · · , N2) are used to generate
tags identifying the set policies. The CA then publishes the
public parameters params which include the ticket price
policy P together with the range and set policy tags.
8CA publishes the ticket price polices P = {R1, · · · ,RN1 , S1, · · · , SN2} where Rl = [cl, dl] is a range policy (i.e. age,
mileage) and Si = {Ii1 , Ii2 , · · · , Iiς} is a set policy (i.e. location, profession, disbility) and consists of ς items Iij for
l = 1, 2, · · · , N1 and i = 1, 2, · · · , N2.
CA runs BG(1`)→ (e, p,G,Gτ ). Suppose that the longest interval length in {R1, · · · ,RN1} is [0, qk) where q ∈ Zp and
p > 2qk+1. Let g, g0, g1, g2, g3, gˆ1, gˆ2, · · · , gˆN1 , h, g, η, ξ, ρ, ϑ, η1, η2, · · · , ηN2 be generators of G, H : {0, 1}∗ → Zp and
H ′ : {0, 1}∗ → G be two cryptographic hash functions.
CA selects x, y, µ1, µ2, · · · , µN2 R← Zp and computes g˜ = gx, h˜ = hy, h0 = h
1
y , h1 = h
1
y+1 , h2 = h
1
y+2 , · · · ,
hq−1 = h
1
y+q−1 , h˜0 = h
q0 , h˜1 = h
q, · · · , h˜k−1 = hqk−1 , η˜1 = ηµ11 , η˜2 = ηµ22 , · · · , ˜ηN2 = ηµN2N2 and(
ηi1 = η
1
µi+H(Ii1
) , ηi2 = η
1
µi+H(Ii2
) , · · · , ηiς = η
1
µi+H(Iiς
)
)N2
i=1
.
The secret key of CA is MSK = (x, y, µ1, µ2, · · · , µN2) and the public parameters are params = (e, p,G,Gτ , g, g0,
g1, g2, gˆ1, gˆ2, · · · , gˆN1 , h, g, η, ξ, ρ, g˜, h˜, h0, h1, · · · , hq−1, h˜0, h˜1, · · · , h˜k−1, η1, η2, · · · , ηN2 , η˜1, η˜2, · · · , η˜N2 , (ηi1 , ηi2 , · · · ,
ηiς )
N2
i=1).
Fig. 2. Setup Algorithm
Registration. The steps involved in the registration process
are shown in Figure 3. The registration of a seller S requires
S to generate a secret-public key pair (xs, YS). He sends YS
to the CA as well as a proof of knowledge Π1S to demonstrate
he knows the secret key xs. Using some out-of-band chan-
nel, S authenticates himself to the CA and provides evidence
that he is allowed to operate as a seller. If Π1S is valid and the
authentication is successful, the CA generates a credential
σS which is a BBS+ signature including the public key YS as
well as a validity period V PS for it. These details are then
sent back to S who verifies that the CA has authorized him
as a seller by validating the credential σS .
In the case of a user registration, a user U generates a
secret-public key pair (xu, YU ) and submits her public key
PU together with a proof of knowledge Π1U showing that
she knows the secret key xu. She also sends the CA the list
of attributes AU (e.g. age, profession, location, etc.) which
allow her to get discounted tickets. Again, using an out-
of-band channel, she authenticates herself to the CA and
provides evidence for the claimed attributes. If
∏1
U holds,
the authentication is successful and the CA is satisfied with
the provided evidence, it generates a credential σU which
is a BBS+ signature scheme including the public key YU , its
validity period V PU as well as the corresponding attributes
AU . These details are sent back to U who uses them to verify
that she is now a legitimate user of the system and that her
attributes have been certified by the CA.
Ticket Issuing. Figure 4 shows the details of the ticket issuing
phase. Let PU consists of the names of range polices and set
policies satisfied by U. In order to prevent attackers from
collecting users’ private information, a seller S first needs to
prove to U that he is authorised by the CA. This is done
by constructing a proof of knowledge Π2S of the seller’s
credential σS . If the proof holds, the user U proceeds by
generating a new pseudonym Y which involves her secret
key xu and constructs a proof of knowledge Π2U of Y . This
proof shows to S that the CA has certified her as a legitimate
user who has the claimed attributes which entitle her to buy
the ticket corresponding to her provided attributes. After S
has successfully verified her proof, he constructs a ticket TU
applying a BBS+ signature scheme which includes the user’s
pseudonym Y , the applicable range and set policies of the
user relevant to the ticket, a serial number to enable double
spend detection as well as the ticket’s price and validity
period V PT . Note that while the ticket price and its validity
period are included in the construction of TU , they are just
free text entries and should only be used when price and
validity periods are required by the application context, e.g.
when the validity period is important, S should check the
user’s credential valid period V PU and make sure that the
ticket valid period V PT is no later than V PU . TU together
with its associated details is then sent back to the user who
can use the information together with the public key of the
seller YS to verify the validity of the information. Note that
our scheme provides ticket unlinkability due to the use of
user pseudonyms which prevents the seller S as well as
any verifier V from linking any two tickets requested by the
same user even if they collude.
Ticket Validation. Figure 5 depicts the steps to validate a
ticket. The user U initializes an empty table TableU to store
the identity information of any verifier V. The purpose of
this table is to ensure that a verifier can only ask for a ticket
once to prevent an honest user from being de-anonymised
by a malicious verifier. The verifier V, on the other hand,
initializes an empty table TableV to store the authentication
transcript from U to determine if a ticket has already been
used (i.e. double spend detection). The ticket verification
process is started by the verifier sending a fresh nonce r and
its identity IDV to the user. It is assumed that there is some
out-of-band channel which allows the user to “authenticate”
the verifier, e.g. it is a guard on the train or a gate at
the entrance of the platform, etc. U first checks that V
does not yet have an entry in TableU . If an entry exists,
U aborts the process to avoid de-anonymisation. Otherwise,
she proceeds to send V a “ticket transcript”, TransT , of her
ticket TicketU , which includes a zero-knowledge proof of
knowledge Π3U . The transcript should convince V that she
is a legitimate user who is in the possession of a valid ticket
TicketU . Because TicketU includes the user’s secret key xu
as part of her pseudonym Y , knowledge of which needs
to be demonstrated as part of Π3U . Our scheme ensures
ticket untransferability assuming U’s private key has not been
9Ticket Seller S Central Authority CA
Selects xs
R← Zp and computes YS = ρxs .
Computes the proof Π1S : PoK{xs : YS = ρxs}.
IDS ,YS ,Π
1
S−−−−−−−→ Selects cs, rs R← Zp and computes
Verifies e(σS , g˜gcs)
?
= e(g0, g) · e(g, g1)H(V PS) cs, rs,←−−−−−−
σS , V PS
σS = (g0g
H(V PS)
1 YSg
rs)
1
x+cs , where V PS is a valid
·e(YS , g) · e(g, g)rs . period.
Keeps the credential CredS = (cs, rs, σS).
User U Central Authority CA
Selects xu
R← Zp and computes YU = ξxu .
Selects r R← Zp and compute R = gr.
Computes the proof Π1U :
PoK {(xu, r) : YU = ξxu ∧ R = gr}. IDU ,YU ,R,−−−−−−−→
AU ,Π1U
Selects cu, r′
R← Zp and computes σU =
Computes ru = r + r′.
cu, r
′,←−−−−−−
σU , V PU
(
g0g
H(V PU )
1 YURg
r′∏N1
l=1 gˆ
al
l
∏N2
i=1 η
H(Iij )
i
) 1
x+cu
Verifies e(σU , g˜gcu) = e(g0, g) · e(g, g1)H(V PU )· where V PU is a valid period, al ∈ AU |= Rl and
e(YU , g) · e(g, g)ru ·
∏N1
l=1 e(gˆl, g)
al · AU |= Iij .∏N2
i=1 e(ηi, g)
H(Iij ).
Keeps the credential CredU = (cu, ru, σU ). Stores (IDU , AU , YU , σU ).
Fig. 3. Registration Algorithm
compromised. Moreover, the transcript also incorporates
V ’s nonce r to prevent simple replay attacks. U completes
her part in the validation process by updating her TableU
storing V ’s identity together with r. If V can successfully
verify U ’s ticket transcript, V grants her access to the service
and updates TableV with TransT ; otherwise, V denies the
request.
Double Spend Detecting. Figure 6 shows the double spend
detection process. To determine whether a ticket is being
double spent, V checks TableV for another ticket transcript
TransU with the same serial number D. If there is, the
ticket is being double spent and V can de-anonymise U
by extracting her public key YU from the two transcripts;
otherwise, it is a new ticket.
It is worth pointing out that the construction of our
scheme has the following additional benefit.
Limited Dynamic Policy Update. If the seller S needs to either
update some policies in P or create new ones, he can contact
the central authority CA to update or create the relevant
public parameters params. As a result, when buying a
ticket, a user U proves to S that his attributes satisfy the
updated policies by using the updated params and S will
generate tickets according to the updated policies. U only
needs to obtain new credentials from the CA if her current
attributes do not satisfy the updated policies any more.
For example, suppose that Alice is 16 years old. If the
seller S requests that the existing policy range of [12, 18]
is changed to [15, 20] instead, then Alice can still use her
existing credentials. However, if the policy were changed
from [12, 18] to [18, 25] instead, then Alice would need to
contact the CA to update her credentials.
Correctness. The correctness of our scheme is shown in the
the full version of this paper [55].
5 BENCHMARKING RESULTS
In this section we evaluate the performance of our scheme.
The source code of the scheme’s implementation is available
at [56] and its performance has been measured on a Dell
Inspiron Latitude E5270 laptop with an Intel Core i7-6600U
CPU, 1TB SSD and 16GB of RAM running Fedora 27. The
implementation makes use of bilinear maps defined over
elliptic curves as well as other cryptographic primitives.
We used the JPBC library [57] for the bilinear maps and
bouncycastle [58] for the other cryptographic required by
our scheme. Note that the Java based implementation of the
JPBC API [57] was used throughout.
Recall from Section 2 that our scheme requires a Type
I symmetric bilinear map, e : G × G → Gτ . The JPBC
library [57] provides three different instances of a symmetric
pairing with their Type A, A1 or E pairings. The Type A and
A1 pairings are based on the elliptic curve E : y2 = x3 + x
over the finite field Fp. In both cases, the group G in is
the group of points on the elliptic curve, E(Fp). The Type
E pairing, on the other hand, is based on the Complex
Multiplication (CM) method of constructing elliptic curves
starting with the Diophantine equation DV 2 = 4p− t2. The
details of each construction can be found in [59].
In our implementation, we use the default parameters
during the instantiation of the different pairings, e.g. Type
A is constructed using rBits = 160, qBits = 512, Type A1
uses 2 primes of size qBits = 512 and Type E is instantiated
with rBits = 160 and qBits = 1024.
Note that according to Table 1 in [60], JPBC’s default
Type A pairing provides approximately the equivalent of 80-
bit symmetric or 1024 RSA-style security. This is sufficient
for providing a baseline for taking time measurements.
For the hash functions H : {0, 1}∗ → Zp and H ′ :
{0, 1}∗ → G required by our scheme (see Fig 2), we used
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User: U Ticket Seller: S
Selects z, v R← Zp and computes
Q = σSϑ
z , Z = gzϑv , Zcs = gz
′
ϑv
′
(z′ = zcs, v′ = vcs).
Let PU consists of the names of range polices
Π2S ,V PS←−−−−− Computes the proof Π2S :
and set policies satisfied by U. PoK
{
(cs, rs, σS , z, v) : Z = g
zϑv ∧ Zcs =
Let al ∈ AU , al ∈ [cl, dl),
al − cl, al − dl + qk ∈ [0, qk), gz′ϑv′ ∧ e(Q,g˜)e(g0,g)·e(g1,g)H(V PS) · = e(ρ, g)
xs ·
al − cl =
∑k−1
i=0 wliq
i, al − dl + qk =
∑k−1
i=0 w
′
li
qi, e(g, g)rs · e(Q, g)−cs · e(ϑ, g)csz · e(ϑ, g˜)z
}
.
where wli , w
′
li
∈ [0, 1, · · · , q − 1].
Selects d, α, β, γ1, γ2, · · · , γN1 , tl0 , tl1 , · · · , tlk−1 ,
t′l0 , t
′
l1
, · · · , t′lk−1 , e1, e2, · · · , eN2
R← Zp.
Computes C = σUϑα, D = gαϑβ , Dcu = gα
′
ϑβ
′
,
Y = ξxugd1 ,
(
Zl = g
γlhal , (Awli = h
tli
wli
,
A′wli = h
t′li
wli
)k−1i=0 )
N1
l=1,
(
Bij = η
ei
ij
)N2
i=1
,
where α′ = αcu, β′ = βcu.
Computes the proof Π2U :
Π2U ,Y−−−−−→
V PU ,PU
PoK
{(
xu, cu, ru, d, α, β, α
′, β′,
(
al, (tli , t
′
li
, wli ,
w′li)
k−1
i=0
)N1
l=1
, (ei, H(Iij )
N2
i=1
)
: Y = ξxugd1
∧Zl = gγlhal ∧ D = gαϑβ ∧ Dcu = gα′ϑβ′
∧ e(C,g˜)
e(g0,g)·e(g1,g)H(V PU ) = e(ξ, g)
xu · e(g, g)ru ·∏N1
l=1 e(gˆl, g)
al ·∏N2i=1 e(ηi, g)H(Iij )·
e(C, g)−cu · e(ϑ, g)α′ · e(ϑ, g˜)α
∧(Zlh−cl = gγl∏k−1i=0 h˜wlii
∧Zlh−(dl−qk) = gγ1
∏k−1
i=0 h˜
w′li
i Selects d
′, su, ωu
R← Zp and computes
∧(e(Awli , h˜) = e(h, h)tli · e(Awli , h)−wli )k−1i=0 TU = (g0Y gd
′
1 g
su
2 g
ψu
3 )
1
xs+ωu where su is
∧(e(A′wli , h˜) = e(h, h)
t′li · e(A′wli , h)
−w′li )k−1i=0
)N1
l=1
a serial number, ψu = H(PU ||Price||Serv
∧
(
e(Bij , η˜i) = e(η, ηi)
ei · e(Bij , ηi)H(Iij )
)N2
i=1
}
||V PT ), Price is the price of the ticket,
Serv are the services which U wants to
Computes du = d+ d′ and checks
TU ,d
′,su,ωu,ψu,←−−−−−−−−−−−
Serv,Price,V PT
access and V PT is a valid period.
e(TU , Ysρ
ωu)
?
= e(g0, ρ) · e(YU , ρ) · e(g1, ρ)du ·
e(g2, ρ)
su · e(g3, ρ)ψu .
Keeps the pseudonym as PsU = ξxug
du
1 and
the ticket as TicketU = (du, su, ψu, ωu, TU ,
PU , P rice, Serv, V PT ).
Fig. 4. Ticket Issuing Algorithm
SHA256 for H and rely on the implementation of “newEle-
mentFromHash()” method in the JPBC library for H ′.
5.1 Timings
Table 3 shows the results of the computational time spent in
the various phases of our proposed scheme which required
more complex computations (i.e. some form of verifica-
tion using bilinear maps or generation of zero knowledge
proofs). The timings shown have been calculated as the
average over 20 iterations.
The maximum range interval in this instance was 7
which is covered by the interval [0, 23) and thus k = 3 in
the set-up algorithm described in Fig 2. The maximum set
size used was 10. It is clear from the computations involved
in the generation of Π2U (see the full version [55]) that the
computational cost of a range proof increases with k while
the number of computations for a set membership proof is
independent on the size of the set. As such the numbers
presented below provide a reasonable lower bound of the
computational costs for range proofs assuming that any
useful ranges will have at least an interval length of 4 or
more.
Table 3 shows the timings for our current implementa-
tion of our scheme with 2 small range policies and 4 set
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User: U Ticket Verifier: V
Initializes an empty table: TableU . Initializes an empty table: TableV .
Checks:
IDV , r←−−−−− Selects r R← Zp
(1) If H(IDV ) ∈ TableU , aborts;
(2) If H(IDV ) 6∈ TableU , goes to the next step.
Selects pi, λ R← Zp and computes
D = gsu , E = ξxuH ′(IDV )rsu , F = TUϑpi , J = gpiϑλ
and W = Jωu = gpi
′
ϑλ
′
where pi′ = piωu and λ′ = λωu.
Computes the proof Π3U :
PoK
{
(xu, du, su, ωu, pi, λ, pi
′, λ′) : D = gsu∧
PsU = ξ
xugdu1 ∧ E = ξxuH ′(IDV )rsu∧
J = gpiϑλ ∧W = Jωu = gpi′ϑλ′∧
e(F,YS)
e(g0,ρ)·e(PsU ,ρ)·e(g3,ρ)ψu = e(g2, ρ)
su · e(F, ρ)−ωu ·
e(ϑ, ρ)pi
′ · e(ϑ, ρ)pi
}
.
The proof transcript is: TransT = ((D,E), F, J,W,ψu,
TransT−−−−−−→
PsU ,V PT
Checks ψu
?
= H(PU ||Price||Serv||V PT )
PsU ,PU , P rice, Serv, V PT ,Π3U ). and the proof
∏3
U .
Updates: TableU = TableU ∪ {H(IDV ), r}. Updates: TableV = TableV ∪ {((r,D,E),
F, J, ψu)}.
Fig. 5. Ticket Validation Algorithm
If there exit ((r,D,E), F, J) ∈ TableV and transcript ((r′, D′, E′), F ′, J ′) ∈ TableV with D = D′ and E 6= E′,
the ticket with serial number su is being double spent. Let E = ξxuH ′(IDV )rsu and E′ = ξxuH ′(IDV )r
′su .
To detect the double spend user, V computes E
r′
E′r =
ξxur
′
H′(IDV )r
′rsu
ξxurH′(IDV )r
′rsu = ξ
xu(r
′−r) and YU = ξxu = (E
r′
E′r )
1
r′−r .
Hence, U with public key YU is a double spend user.
Fig. 6. Double Spend Detection
TABLE 3
Benchmark results (in ms)
Protocol phase Entity (#range policies,#set policies)= (2, 4)
Type A Type A1 Type E
System Initialisation - Central Authority (CA)
initialise the system CA 626.05.1 9155.95 2895.25
Issuing phase
generate PoK Π2S Seller 184.25 2881.8 469.1
verify Π2S User 107.9 1424.95 286.2
generate ticket request, Π2U User 1008.7 17195.95 2847.35
verify Π2U Seller 787.3 11288.0 2166.25
generate ticket Seller 47.85 583.0 120.3
verify ticket User 52.5 856.75 158.35
Ticket Verification - Verifier (V)
generate ticket transcript TransT User 241.4 3538.7 707.4
verify transcript Verifier 214.05 2539.8 649.8
Total system run time
All phases All 3659.1 54382.95 11383.1
TABLE 4
Type A: benchmark results for different ranges and set sizes(in ms)
Ticket issuing phase k = 5 k = 10 k = 20 s = 10 s = 100
[0, 31] [0, 1023] [0, 1048755] {x|1 ≤ x ≤ 10} {x|1 ≤ x ≤ 100}
range/set proof creation ≈ 512 ≈ 961 ≈ 1998 ≈ 35 ≈ 36
range/set proof verification ≈ 367 ≈ 599 ≈ 1116 ≈ 22 ≈ 23
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policies using the default instantiation of the three different
symmetrical pairings available in JPBC. The fastest perfor-
mance is achieved by the JPBC Type A curve based Type
I pairing, where ticket issuing and verification take ≈ 2.2s
and ≈ 450ms respectively.
Table 4 illustrates the impact of different range and set
sizes on the computational effort during the ticket issuing
phase using the JBPC Type A curve, where [0, qk] is the
range length and s is the cardinality of the set. It is clear that
set membership proofs can be computed much faster than
range proofs and their computational cost is independent
of the set size whereas for range proofs the computational
effort increases linearly with k.
However, range proofs provide an additional benefit
which is best illustrated with an example: a young person’s
age could be either codified in a range policy (age ∈ [15, 25])
or with a set policy (“young person”). Our scheme provides
the policy maker with the flexibility to decide which kind
of policies should be used. While a set policy is computa-
tionally more efficient than a range policy, range policies
can potentially accommodate future policy changes. In par-
ticular, suppose that Alice is 23 years old and the current
young person range policy is given by age ∈ [16, 22] which
means Alice cannot obtain a discount. However, if it is later
changed to age ∈ [16, 25], Alice can still use her existing
age attribute of 23 to obtain a young person discount as
she can now prove her age falls within the updated range.
However, if the set policy approach had been used, Alice
would need to return to the CA to update her credentials
as she would not have been eligible for her signed “young
person” attribute, previously.
Consequently, for any real system, it is important to look
at the trade-off between the flexibility that range policies
allow in terms of dynamic updates and their more expensive
computational cost.
6 SECURITY ANALYSIS
To demonstrate its security, we need to prove indistin-
guishability between the behaviours of the real-world ad-
versary A and the behaviours of the ideal-world adversary
A′. Given a real-world adversary A, there exist an ideal-
world adversary A′ such that no environment E can distin-
guish whether it is interacting with A or A′. The proof is
based on sublemmas where different corrupted parties are
considered. The following cases are not considered: (1) the
CA is the only honest party; (2) the CA is the only dishonest
party; (3) all parties are dishonest; and (4) all parties are
honest. The first three do not make a sensible system while
the last one is trivially secure. Since the CA needs to know
U’s attributes to issue her with her credentials, we assume
that CA is honest and fully trusted by the other entities.
In order to prove the indistinguishability between
RealE,A(`) and IdealE,A′ , a sequence of games Game0,
Game1, · · · , Gamen are defined. For each Gamei, we con-
struct a simulator Simi that runs A as a subroutine and
provides E ’s view, for i = 0, 1, · · · , n. HybridE,Simi(`) de-
notes the probability that E outputs 1 running in the world
provided by Simi. Sim0 runs A and other honest par-
ties in the real-world experiment, hence HybridE,Sim0 =
RealE,A. Simn runs A′ in ideal-world experiment, hence
HybridE,Simn(`) = IdealE,A′(`). Therefore,
|RealE,A(`)− IdealE,A′ | ≤
∣∣RealE,A(`)−HybridE,Sim1 ∣∣
+
∣∣HybridE,Sim1 − hHybridE,Sim2 ∣∣+ · · ·+∣∣∣HybridE,Simn−1 −HybridE,Simn ∣∣∣ .
Theorem 3. Our privacy-preserving electronic ticket scheme
with attribute-based credentials described in Fig. 2, Fig.
3, Fig. 4, Fig. 5 and Fig. 6 is secure if the q-strong
Diffie-Hellamn assumption (q-SDH) holds on the bilin-
ear group (e, p,G,Gτ ).
Theorem 3 is proven by using the following two lemmas.
Lemma 1. (User Privacy) For all environments E and all
real-world adversariesAwho statically control the ticket
seller S and verifier V, there exists an ideal-world adver-
sary A′ such that |RealE,A(`)− IdealE,A′(`)| ≤ 2 1` .
The proof of Lemma 1 is given in the full version of this
paper [55]. Since anonymity, ticket unlinkability and ticket
untransferability are part of user privacy, they are therefore
proved by Lemma 1.
Lemma 2. (Seller Security) For all environments E and all
real-world adversaries A who statically controls the ver-
ifier V and one or more users, there exists an ideal-word
adversary A′ such that |RealE,A(`)− IdealE,A′(`)| ≤
qT
2`
+ qv
2`
+ 1qIAdv
qI-SDH
A (`) + Adv
(q+1)-SDH
A (`) +
Adv
(ς+1)-SDH
A (`) +
1
qT
AdvqT -SDHA (`) +
1
qV
AdvqV -SDHA (`), where qT , qI , qV are the numbers
of ticket issue queries, credential queries and ticket
validation queries made by A, respectively.
The proof of Lemma 2 is given in the full version of this
paper [55]. Since unforgeability, double spending detection
and de-anonymization are included in the seller security,
they are therefore proved by Lemma 2. Therefore, Theorem
4 is proven because both Lemma 1 and Lemma 2 hold.
7 FUTURE WORK AND CONCLUSIONS
To protect user privacy in e-ticket schemes, various schemes
have been proposed but they do not address attribute-based
ticketing. Similarly, privacy-preserving attribute-based cre-
dential schemes are proposed where attributes can either be
elements of a set or within a range but this paper proposes
a scheme to support both the use of sets and ranges within
the same scheme. The paper has defined such a scheme
together with its security model and security proof. The
benefit of this scheme is to provide a policy maker with
the flexibility to decide which kind of policies should be
used. Set policies are computationally more efficient than
range policies but the latter could potentially accommodate
future policy changes. Currently, our scheme is not suitable
for portable devices, e.g. smart phone, tablet, etc., due to its
high computation cost and communication overhead.
Our future work will be looking at the impact on the
security model and proof when dynamic policy updates
are allowed as well as changes to scheme’s implementation
to improve its performance, e.g. by pre-computing static
values where possible and using the C-based PBC library
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[61], outsourcing computation [62], [63], verifiable outsourc-
ing computation [64], [65], [66], etc. Another open problem
and an interesting area for our future work is to construct
a privacy-preserving e-ticket scheme with attribute-based
credentials using the most efficient type of pairing, the Type-
III pairing.
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